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Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies
by

Edward R. Morrison and Antoine Uettwiller*
This paper questions several long-standing descriptions of consumer bankruptcy
in the United States. We focus on Chapter 13, which discharges debts after consumers pay disposable income to creditors for up to five years. Many studies
document pathologies, including high failure rates, racial disparities, low creditor
recoveries, and attorney biases. We observe the same patterns in new data drawn
from Cook County, Illinois, but show that these pathologies are central tendencies that ignore substantial heterogeneity across consumers. Several pathologies
are driven by subsets of consumers; some disappear once we take account of
consumer heterogeneity. We present new evidence that some pathologies reflect
biases in nonbankruptcy law, not in the bankruptcy process itself. (JEL: J22, K35,
D14)

1 Introduction
The United States is one of the few countries in the world to offer consumers alternative paths to achieving a discharge of debt in bankruptcy court. One path is
liquidation in Chapter 7: the consumer obtains a discharge by liquidating assets.
Another is a “reorganization” in Chapter 13: the consumer obtains a discharge by
complying with a repayment plan, which involves paying all disposable income to
creditors during a three- to five-year period.
An emerging empirical literature documents the characteristics of consumers
who select Chapter 13 and their case outcomes. The literature points to puzzling
patterns and pathologies: Although Chapter 13 is primarily attractive as a way to
*
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avoid liquidation of assets, it rarely does that in practice. The vast majority of consumers – over two-thirds – fail to complete their repayment plans. Their cases are
terminated – either dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 – exposing their assets to
the very liquidation they tried to avoid. This pattern is especially puzzling because
Chapter 13 cases are substantially more expensive for the consumer: fees charged
by attorneys and trustees (who assist the court in administering the bankruptcy process) are at least three times as large as in Chapter 7. Why do consumers pay such
high fees to commence a process that is highly likely to fail?
Other studies have pointed to racial disparities in Chapter 13: African-American
consumers are substantially more likely to choose Chapter 13, instead of Chapter 7, than other racial and ethnic groups. Cases filed by African Americans are
also substantially more likely to terminate prematurely, leading to liquidation of
their assets. These racial disparities are thought to be driven, at least in part, by
attorneys who systematically “steer” African-American clients into Chapter 13.
Indeed, a related literature suggests that the high fees available in Chapter 13 lead
attorneys to push consumers, regardless of race, into Chapter 13 even when there
is little financial benefit (relative to Chapter 7) for the consumer. And although
attorneys may benefit from Chapter 13, an emerging set of studies suggests that
creditors obtain little or no benefit. One study reports that the median recovery to
both secured and unsecured creditors is zero in Chapter 13 cases.
These patterns and pathologies – high failure rates, racial disparities, attorney
agency problems, and low financial benefits to both consumers and creditors –
raise questions about (i) why rational consumers select Chapter 13 even when the
apparent benefits are low and (ii) whether these pathologies can be mitigated by
legal or other reforms.
The goal of this paper is to present a new battery of facts drawn from bankruptcy
cases filed in an urban setting, Cook County, Illinois, which includes Chicago and
immediately surrounding suburbs and is within the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In some respects, these facts complement the findings of prior scholars. But the paper also presents new patterns that
cast doubt on inferences drawn from prior studies. In particular, we present the
following findings.
First, prior studies ignore substantial heterogeneity in the benefits of Chapter 13
cases to consumers. Some consumers have incurred fines that are dischargeable
in Chapter 13, but not in Chapter 7. Some have become delinquent on mortgages
and seek additional time to “come current” on past-due amounts. Some must use
Chapter 13 because their incomes disqualify them from filing for Chapter 7. Once
we account for this heterogeneity in case type, a number of patterns and pathologies
become questionable.
Second, it is often said that Chapter 13 is a way to “save your home” from
liquidation, but our data from Cook County show that this is not true for over a
third of consumers. A large proportion of Chapter 13 filers – between one-third and
a half – are filing because local governments have suspended, or are threatening to
suspend, their driving licenses or seize their cars because they have accumulated
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excessive fines (usually parking tickets). These consumers tend to have few or no
assets and incomes near the poverty line. They appear to be filing to prevent the
government from holding their licenses or cars as hostages for repayment.
Third, failure rates vary substantially by consumer type in our data. They are
half as large among consumers who file Chapter 13 in order to save their homes as
among consumers with excessive fines.
Fourth, racial disparities observed in prior work appear to be a product, at least
in part, of racial disparities in the incidence of fines. At least in Cook County,
African Americans may be substantially more likely to incur fines. Among consumers without parking tickets, we observe smaller disparities in the proportion of
cases filed by African Americans. Moreover, even though African Americans make
up the bulk of consumers with fines, case outcomes among these consumers exhibit
few of the racial disparities found in prior studies. Paradoxically, the category of
cases generating the appearance of racial discrimination – consumers with fines –
is also the category where we are least likely to observe race-based differences in
case outcomes.
Finally, creditor recoveries vary substantially with the value of the assets at risk
of liquidation, but in a counterintuitive way. Unsecured creditors achieve higher
returns in Chapter 13 (relative to Chapter 7) when their expected recovery in Chapter 7 is smaller. This appears to be due, in part, to efforts by bankruptcy trustees
to require consumers in Chapter 13 to pay at least 10 % recoveries to unsecured
creditors, even when these creditors would receive nothing in Chapter 7. The policy applied by trustees might also contribute to Chapter 13 failure rates, because
consumers agree to pay more than they can potentially afford.
We present these and other facts in this short paper for two reasons: to raise
questions about prior work, and to motivate future scholarship. Section 2 describes
the institutional setting that we study here. Section 3 summarizes the patterns and
pathologies documented in prior work. Sections 4 and 5 describe our data and
present summary statistics that confirm what was found in prior work. Section 6
presents our results. Section 7 concludes. Because our results are drawn from Cook
County, Illinois, future work is needed to assess whether patterns observed here are
evident in other areas too. In many respects, as shown below, the characteristics of
Cook County consumers are very similar to those documented in other studies.
There are, however, features of the institutional environment in Cook County that
could raise doubts about the generalizability of our findings. We discuss these issues in section 7.

2 Institutional Background
Bankruptcy is a collective proceeding to remedy mass default by a consumer. Most
consumers use either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 to conduct this proceeding. Chapter 7
allows a consumer to trade assets for a discharge of most debts. She gives up assets
that are not exempt under state or federal law. In Illinois, for example, the consumer
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is permitted to keep retirement savings, up to $2,400 of the value of a motor vehicle,
$15,000 in home equity, and $4,000 of other property. The value of property in
excess of these limits must be distributed to creditors. In practice, however, the
vast majority of Chapter 7 bankruptcies involves consumers who give up no assets
because all of their property is exempt.
Chapter 13 offers a different bargain: The consumer trades her future disposable income for a broader discharge of debts. She keeps most or all of her assets.
The consumer pays her disposable income during a three- to five-year period. The
payments are made to a trustee (Chapter 13 trustee), who distributes the payments
to creditors in order of priority and charges a fee for this service. If the consumer
makes all payments scheduled under her Chapter 13 plan, she receives a discharge
of most debts. Importantly, the discharge in Chapter 13 is broader than in Chapter 7.
In particular, a consumer can discharge civil fines owed to government agencies in
Chapter 13, but not in Chapter 7.
A Chapter 13 plan is equivalent to an agreement in which creditors lease assets
to the consumer in exchange for monthly rental payments. The value of the assets (A) is equal to that of the consumer’s nonexempt property. The lease term (N )
is largely fixed by statute: It is three years for consumers with incomes below the
state median, it is five years for those with higher incomes, and it can be a shorter
period either if the consumer agrees to pay unsecured creditors in full or if the parties consent. The monthly payments (b ) are also fixed by statute: They must have a
present value (V ) at least as large as the assets A and not less than the consumer’s
disposable monthly income (y ). In practice, consumers propose plans that pay all
disposable income (b D y ). If r is the monthly discount rate, a Chapter 13 plan
promises the following payment stream:
t
N 
X
1
VD
b  A:
1Cr
tD1

Notice that all of the parameters except r are fixed either by statute or by the existing value of the consumer’s assets.
The foregoing suggests that a consumer may choose Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7 in order to prevent liquidation of assets or take advantage of the broader
discharge. There is a third reason: Some consumers are ineligible for Chapter 7
because their incomes exceed a means-test threshold or because they have already
obtained a Chapter 7 discharge in the recent past.
The bankruptcy judge has two primary tasks. One is to decide whether to approve the consumer’s plan. A judge will terminate a case – that is, dismiss it or
convert it to Chapter 7 – if the plan violates the statute or the consumer is highly
unlikely to be able to complete the plan of payments. The second is to decide
whether a case should be terminated after an event of default. Consumers commonly miss one or more scheduled payments. A judge can terminate the case, offer
forbearance by deferring payment of overdue amounts to a later date, or grant the
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consumer’s motion to modify the plan (perhaps to reduce the payments due under
the plan).
In the typical case, there are three types of creditors: secured, priority, and general unsecured. Secured creditors include mortgage auto, and other lenders with
security interests in collateral. Priority debts are unsecured claims that receive priority over general unsecured claims under federal law. These include debts owed
for federal taxes and for domestic support obligations. General unsecured claims
are a residual category often dominated by credit-card lenders. A Chapter 13 plan
generally cannot be confirmed unless it promises to pay secured debt in full or according to its contractual terms (or secured creditors consent to different treatment)
and unless it promises to pay most priority debts in full. Unsecured creditors need
only be paid at least what they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.

3 Patterns and Pathologies in Prior Scholarship
Empirical bankruptcy scholarship in the United States presents several patterns and
pathologies – some better established and some more puzzling than others – about
consumers who select Chapter 13 and their case outcomes.
Perhaps the most durable pattern is that Chapter 13 is primarily attractive to
consumers seeking to prevent liquidation of an asset, such as a home or car, as
documented by White and Zhu (2010), among others. Indeed, this proposition is
seemingly self-evident, because the principal distinguishing feature of Chapter 13,
relative to Chapter 7, is avoidance of liquidation.
Another durable pattern is the high rate of termination: Around two-thirds of
Chapter 13 cases terminate before the consumer has completed the repayment plan.
Li (2007) and Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2003) summarize various studies
documenting this pattern. If a case terminates prematurely, either it is converted to
a liquidation under Chapter 7 or it is dismissed, allowing creditors to pursue statelaw remedies to liquidate the consumer’s assets. Thus, a “failed” Chapter 13 case
merely delays liquidation. Given the relatively high costs of Chapter 13, which
has substantially higher attorney and other fees than Chapter 7, it has long been
puzzling why Chapter 13 cases fail as often as they do and why consumers choose
Chapter 13 when failure rates are so high.
Chapter 13 cases also exhibit racial disparities and, perhaps, racial discrimination. Braucher, Cohen, and Lawless (2012) show that, among bankruptcy filers,
African Americans are substantially more likely than other racial or ethnic groups
to file a Chapter 13 case. Using a field experiment, they present evidence that
lawyers are more likely to counsel (steer) African-American clients toward Chapter 13 than clients from other racial or ethnic groups.1 Case outcomes also exhibit
racial disparities, as Van Loo (2009) shows using 2001 data: The success rate (de1 Lefgren, McIntyre, and Miller (2010) and McIntyre, Sullivan, and Summers (2015)
present additional evidence that attorneys steer clients toward Chapter 13 because these
cases are more lucrative.
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fined as obtaining a discharge in Chapter 13) for white consumers was 28 %, but
only about 20 % for African Americans. Braucher, Cohen, and Lawless (2012) also
find that the probability of termination during the first ten to fourteen months after case filing is substantially higher for African Americans (36 %) than for other
groups (about 26 %).
Another pattern (or pathology) emerging from the literature is that a nontrivial
proportion of consumers file for Chapter 13 even when there is no obvious financial
benefit. This phenomenon is a potential implication of the previous two: If some
consumers are being steered to Chapter 13 even though they are better suited to
Chapter 7, these consumers may derive little financial benefit from the Chapter 13
filing. McIntyre, Sullivan, and Summers (2015) present preliminary evidence from
Texas, comparing consumers with different amounts of collateral at risk of liquidation. If a principal goal of Chapter 13 is to prevent liquidation of assets, consumers
with relatively little collateral should derive less benefit from Chapter 13 than consumers with large amounts of collateral at risk of liquidation. They find that the
likelihood of filing for Chapter 13 depends on the consumer’s attorney: Consumers
represented by attorneys with a high propensity to use Chapter 13 are more likely
to file for Chapter 13 than consumers represented by other attorneys, even if the
consumer has little collateral at risk of liquidation.2
Finally, creditor recoveries in Chapter 13 are thought to be meager. Using Delaware data from 2001–2002, Eraslan et al. (2014) find that the median recovery
rate is zero for both unsecured and secured creditors. Norberg and Velkey (2006)
find that unsecured-creditor recoveries average about 19 % overall and about 34 %
in cases that reach completion. Lupica (2012) finds a slightly lower recovery rate
(26.4 %) to unsecured creditors in completed Chapter 13 cases after 2005.

4 Data
We link two data sets describing Chapter 13 cases filed in Cook County, Illinois. We
selected Cook County because of its size and diversity (along economic, racial, and
ethnic dimensions), because of its inclusion among jurisdictions cited by Braucher,
Cohen, and Lawless (2012) as those exhibiting the highest racial disparities, and
because of the availability of data. Our primary data set is drawn from the files
of the National Data Center (NDC), which provides case management assistance
to Chapter 13 trustees. The NDC data include nearly 81,000 cases filed or closed
between 2011 and 2015. The data include information about the plan proposed by
the consumer, the amounts owed to various creditors, and the consumer’s monthly
payment history. Because we are able to track monthly payments and distributions
to each creditor, we can measure – at a monthly frequency – the delinquency status
of every consumer and the recoveries of each creditor.
2 Because the authors do not observe collateral values, they use the value of secured
debt as a proxy for the value of collateral.
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We link the NDC data to court filings maintained by the Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, whose jurisdiction includes Cook County. From
this court, we obtained a copy of the docket text, bankruptcy petition, financial
schedules, Chapter 13 plan, plan modifications, and other documents (court data)
for every case. We searched these documents mechanically or by hand to extract
financial and demographic information about each consumer, including name, income, number and ages of household members, property address, assets and liabilities, and exempt and nonexempt property. We limit our sample to cases filed
by consumers living in Cook County. The court data include bankruptcy filings for
a longer period (1981 to present) than the NDC data and include both Chapter 7
and 13 filings. Although we focus primarily on the intersection between the NDC
and court data, we use the nonintersecting court data to illustrate differences in the
characteristics of Chapter 7 and 13 consumers.
Because we have each consumer’s name and property address, we can also estimate gender, race, and ethnicity. We estimated gender using a database (Genderbase) purchased from a vendor. We estimated race and ethnicity using Census Data
(which report race and ethnicity by zip code from the 2010 census and by surname
from the 2000 census) and data provided by Tzioumis (2015) (which reports race
and ethnicity by first name based on multiple mortgage databases with information from 2007–2010). We combine these data using an algorithm similar to the
one in Elliott et al. (2009). We assign a person’s race or ethnicity if the algorithm
estimates a probability greater than 70 %. Our data allow us to identify only three
mutually exclusive categories: African American, Hispanic, and Other.
After linking our data, we drop cases filed during any calendar year during which
we have fewer than 100 cases. Table 1 shows the number of cases by filing year.
The total is 80,613, and over three-quarters of the cases were filed between 2011
and 2015. Our final database is a mixture of retrospective data (cases closed during
2011–2015) and prospective data (cases originated during 2011–2015). The retrospective data are subject to a survivorship bias; the prospective data are subject
to censoring because we cannot follow them beyond December 2015. Although
we generally present results using the full sample, we obtain closely comparable
results in the prospective sample.
Table 1
Chapter 13 Cases by Filing Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Total

Observations 484 1,357 3,064 5,126 7,940 10,110 12,232 13,561 15,303 11,436 80,613
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5 Summary Statistics
Table 2 describes the financial, demographic, and plan characteristics of consumers
in our sample. The median consumer is 46 years old, lives in a two-person household, and has annual income equal to about $35,000, which is about two-thirds of
the state median income ($53,234) and double the poverty line in 2011 ($16,000
for a two-person household). The median consumer’s debt-to-assets ratio exceeds
three. The vast majority of households are single adults with one or more dependent
children. Although the table does not report gender, consumers were equally likely
to be male or female. These statistics are broadly consistent with prior work.3
Only about 40 % of bankruptcy filers own real estate (“homeowners” in Table 2),
and 37 % have mortgages, indicating that saving one’s home is a likely motivation
for less than half of consumers.4 Saving one’s automobile may be the more common goal of Chapter 13, as Panel B shows: nearly 60 % of filers have auto debt
with an average balance of about $15,000. However, a majority of consumers have
few, if any, assets (nonexempt property) that would be liquidated in Chapter 7.
Panel B reports that nearly 75 % have less than $1,000 in nonexempt property. We
chose this threshold because McIntyre, Sullivan, and Summers (2015) and Lupica
(2012), among others, have estimated average attorney fees in Chapter 7 around
$1,000. Over half of consumers neither own a home nor have less than $1,000 in
nonexempt property. The financial benefit of Chapter 13 is not obvious for these
consumers.
Panel C shows that most cases terminate prematurely. Over fifty percent of cases
have failed, and this represents a lower bound because a third of cases remain ongoing. Similar termination rates are reported by Dobbie and Song (2015) and Li
(2007), among others. Also consistent with prior work, our data show that creditor recoveries are generally meager. The mean recovery is 17 %; the median is
zero. Recovery rates, however, are much more substantial among discharged (88 %
median recovery) than terminated (0 % median recovery) cases.
These statistics confirm some longstanding patterns and pathologies reported by
the literature, including a substantial proportion of consumers using Chapter 13 to
save assets (homes or cars) and high failure rates. Table 3 confirms other patterns.
3

Using a national sample of both Chapter 7 and 13 filings during 2007, Braucher,
Cohen, and Lawless (2012) report median annual income of about $27,000 and that the
median consumer had one dependent. However, the debt-to-assets ratio in their sample
was only 1.7, perhaps reflecting the inclusion of Chapter 7 filers with lower debt levels
(they are less likely to have mortgages). In a study collecting data from filings during
1994 in seven judicial districts, Norberg and Velkey (2006) report that consumers had
income equal to about 60 % of state median household income, were equally likely to be
male or female, and had at least one dependent in at least 62 % of cases. Using a national
sample, Dobbie and Song (2015) report an average age equal to about 43.
4 This is somewhat below the mean (52 %) reported by Dobbie, Goldsmith-Pinkham,
and Yang (2015), who analyze a random sample of credit users during the period
2002–2006. It is substantially less than the 95 % homeownership rate observed by White
and Zhu (2010) in a study of Chapter 13 filers in Delaware during 2006.
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Table 2
Characteristics of Chapter 13 Consumers

Panel A: Demographic Characteristics
Age
Household size
% households with children
% households with > 1 adult

Mean

Median

Std. dev.

45.71
2.48
60.97
26.73

46.00
2.00
–
–

13.54
1.58
48.78
44.25

Panel B: Financial Characteristics
Assets
89,504.86 20,450.00 163417.38
% with nonexempt property < $1000
74.90
–
43.36
% homeowner
40.30
–
49.05
% not homeowner and nonexempt property < $1000
54.83
–
49.77
Debt
127,700.82 61,571.83 150786.11
% with mortgage
37.46
–
48.40
% with auto debt
58.92
–
49.20
Annual income
41,747.41 34,596.00 194577.26
% below poverty line
7.17
–
25.80
% below 150 % of poverty line
23.81
–
42.59
% above state median
15.39
–
36.08
Panel C: Plan and Case Characteristics
Terminated (%)
Discharged (%)
Open (%)
% recovery to general unsecured creditors
% recovery in discharged cases
% recovery in terminated cases
Trustee %
Attorney fee
Observations

51.15
14.42
34.43
17.21
63.26
3.87
3.29
2,626.50

–
–
–
0.00
88.10
0.00
3.00
3,400.00

49.99
35.13
47.52
31.98
39.31
12.53
0.85
1498.71

80,599

Panel A shows that African Americans account for a substantially higher proportion of Chapter 13 cases (44 %) than Chapter 7 cases (23 %), consistent with the
argument by Braucher, Cohen, and Lawless (2012), among others, that Chapter 13
exhibits disparate treatment by race.5
Panel B analyzes case characteristics and outcomes by race, confirming that termination rates are substantially higher for African Americans (about 55 %) than
for other groups (between 45 and 49 %). Van Loo (2009) and Braucher, Cohen,
and Lawless (2012) report a similar pattern. Equally important, African-American
consumers are substantially more likely to be in poverty and less likely to have
5 According to the 2010 Census, African Americans account for about 25 % of the
Cook County population.
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Table 3
Consumer Characteristics by Race
%
Panel A: Race
Chapter 13 Cases
African American
Hispanic
Other

44.04
7.35
48.61

Chapter 7 Cases
African American
Hispanic
Other

23.06
15.44
61.50

Panel B: Case Characteristics by Race
African American
% terminated
Income < poverty line
Income < 150 % of poverty line
Nonexempt property < $1000
% Homeowner
% Not homeowner and nonexempt property < $1000
Hispanic
% terminated
Income < poverty line
Income < 150 % of poverty line
Nonexempt property < $1000
% Homeowner
% Not homeowner and nonexempt property < $1000
Other
% Terminated
Income < poverty line
Income < 150 % of poverty line
Nonexempt property < $1000
% Homeowner
% Not homeowner and nonexempt property < $1000

54.65
9.41
30.59
79.86
33.29
62.54
45.32
4.44
19.02
67.69
56.03
38.60
48.80
5.56
8.41
71.13
44.72
49.82

assets – a house or other substantial (nonexempt property) – that are protected by a
Chapter 13 filing. Nonexempt assets are property that would be liquidated in Chapter 7. This finding is consistent with the work of McIntyre, Sullivan, and Summers
(2015), who find that many consumers file Chapter 13 cases when there is no apparent financial benefit for doing so.
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6 Results
Although the foregoing summary statistics confirm patterns and pathologies documented in other studies, our data allow us to explore whether these statistics vary
across subgroups of consumers. This is an important exercise because the “pathologies” of Chapter 13 may reflect the behavior of particular types of consumers. This
is indeed the case, as we show in section 6.1. Our data also allow us to identify patterns in trustee and attorney behavior that have been difficult to study using prior
data sets. We present evidence in section 6.2 that one of Chapter 13’s pathologies – high termination rates – is driven, in part, by the decisions of trustees (who
appear to require consumers to pay creditors more than the statute requires) and
attorneys (whose cases tend to terminate soon after they are paid in full). Finally,
in section 6.3, we document the recoveries of unsecured creditors. Our data allow us to compare recoveries in Chapter 13 with expected recoveries in Chapter 7,
something prior literature has not done. Although our results are drawn from Cook
County, Illinois, and may differ from patterns in other jurisdictions, they show that
a number of long-standing patterns and pathologies may merit reexamination.
6.1 Case Heterogeneity
The statistics reported in section 5 conceal substantial heterogeneity across consumers, as Table 4 illustrates. We stratify consumers based on characteristics that
affect the consumer’s ability or incentive to use Chapter 13.
The bankruptcy statute restricts access to Chapter 7 by high-income consumers,
who face a presumption of “abuse” if they use that style of bankruptcy. These consumers are said to fail the means test. Parra (2016) documents a discontinuous
drop in the probability of a successful (i.e., nondismissed) Chapter 7 filing as consumer income rises above the income thresholds set out by the means test. In other
words, higher-income consumers face severely limited access to Chapter 7. They
file for Chapter 13 because they have few (or no) other options. We identify these
consumers in column I. It has long been thought that Chapter 13 is an avenue for
“saving your home.”
Columns II and III include homeowners, but we separate owners who have become delinquent on their mortgages (arrears) from those who are not delinquent.
We make this distinction not only because delinquent homeowners may be higherrisk consumers, but also because a delinquent homeowner may use the Chapter 13
process to take advantage of the automatic stay, not to obtain a discharge. Because
the automatic stay halts collection efforts by the mortgage lender, the homeowner
can use the Chapter 13 process as an opportunity to repay outstanding arrears. Once
those are paid, the original mortgage is reinstated, as discussed by White and Zhu
(2010). At this point, the homeowner may allow the process to terminate (without obtaining a discharge). Thus, homeowners with arrears may have relatively
high termination rates because they are using Chapter 13 to obtain temporary for-

Terminated
< Poverty line
< 150 % Poverty line
Homeowner
Nonexempt property < $1000
Not homeowner and nonexempt property < $1000
African American
Hispanic
Other
% of cases

36.59
0.00
0.00
74.37
51.42
19.65
31.17
8.23
60.42
5.97

35.28
1.58
8.31
100.00
43.67
0.00
37.64
10.77
51.31
14.51

46.65
0.37
4.87
100.00
54.65
0.00
40.48
9.82
49.70
19.50

53.15
12.69
39.14
19.31
86.57
75.98
58.94
4.95
36.11
33.95

44.41
3.63
15.00
48.61
74.13
46.98
40.67
7.93
51.40
24.41

51.81
10.71
31.79
0.00
86.74
86.74
43.51
7.37
47.78
8.28

I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Means Homeowner, Homeowner Tickets Auto debt, Other
test
no arrears
arrears
and fines no tickets

Table 4
Heterogeneity across Consumers: Stratifying Consumers by Potential Motivation for Using Chapter 13

93.08
11.58
29.22
50.47
63.09
40.06
50.36
6.73
32.34
5.99

VII
Pro Se
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bearance, not to obtain a discharge. Jacoby (2007) discusses this phenomenon and
collects relevant literature, but argues that the phenomenon is probably rare.
Column IV focuses on the subset of consumers with government fines – usually
parking and traffic tickets – in excess of $500.6 The bankruptcy statute gives two
reasons why Chapter 13 is attractive for these consumers: First, traffic and parking
tickets and other fines can be discharged in Chapter 13, but not in Chapter 7. Second, the Chapter 13 process triggers an automatic stay that prevents the state or city
government from suspending the consumer’s driver’s license or seizing or disabling
the consumer’s vehicle (and the government must return licenses or vehicles that
have been seized or disabled). In Illinois, a driver’s license can be suspended if the
driver has accumulated ten or more unpaid parking tickets, or at least five unpaid
tickets for certain moving violations. The median fine is $60.7 Among consumers
with tickets or other fines, the average consumer has over $4,000 in such debt (the
median consumer has over $2,700).
Column V identifies consumers with auto debt but no tickets or other fines. These
consumers, like homeowners, are thought to see Chapter 13 as an avenue for preventing liquidation of their property.
Columns I through V are not mutually exclusive. Columns VI and VII identify
two residual categories that include consumers who are excluded from the preceding columns: Consumers who did not exhibit any characteristic listed in prior
columns (“Other”) or who were not represented by an attorney (“Pro Se”). The latter consumers are a high-risk group, most of whom fail to file required documents
and have their cases dismissed within the first two or three months.
The most striking pattern in Table 4 is the percentage of cases – about a third
(see the final row of column IV) – in which consumers have tickets or other fines
that, in total, amount to at least $500 (if we do not apply this floor, over 50 %
have tickets or fines). Putting aside Pro Se and Other cases, the cases in column
IV are extreme in multiple respects: They exhibit the highest termination rates,
lowest homeownership rates, highest rates of consumers with no apparent financial
benefit from filing (“Not homeowner and nonexempt property < 1000”), and the
highest proportion of African-American filers. Although the proportion of African
Americans in the other categories is greater than the proportion in Chapter 7 cases
(see Panel A of Table 3), the difference is substantially smaller after excluding
cases with tickets or other fines.
Put differently, although prior work has pointed to many pathologies in Chapter 13 bankruptcy, in Cook County these pathologies appear to be driven primarily
by consumers using Chapter 13 to cope with fines, such as parking tickets. Additionally, Table 4 is pointing to a potential confound ignored in prior work documenting racial disparities in Chapter 13: African Americans may be more likely
6 We assume a consumer has fines if his or her creditors include Cook County or the
City of Chicago. We verified in a random sample of cases that debts to these entities are
highly likely to be parking or traffic tickets.
7 Fines are summarized at this web address: http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/
depts/fin/supp_info/revenue/general_parking_ticketinformation/violations.html.
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Figure 1
Hazard of Termination by Race, Ethnicity, and Case Type
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than other groups to accumulate debt related to parking tickets and other fines.
Because of this, they are also more likely to use Chapter 13, which is the only avenue by which these debts can be discharged and by which the government can be
stopped from seizing a driver’s license or vehicle.8
The importance of this confound is illustrated in Figure 1, which compares the
monthly hazard of termination – the probability of termination in month t , conditional upon surviving to month t – for all cases and the subset of cases with tickets
and other fines. In the full sample, shown in part (a), African-American cases have
higher termination hazards in every month of the case, consistent with prior studies
pointing to racial disparities in case outcomes. But when we limit the sample to
cases with tickets and other fines, as part (b) does, the difference between African
8

It is possible that, among consumers with parking tickets, African Americans are
more likely than other groups to be steered by attorneys into Chapter 13. Although we
cannot rule out this possibility, Figure 1 offers evidence against it. If African Americans
are being steered into Chapter 13, even though they are a poor fit for it, they should have
higher failure rates than other groups. Part (b) of the figure shows that African Americans
and Others have similar hazard rates.
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Americans and Other (not Hispanic) consumers shrinks substantially. The hazard
curves are virtually on top of each other for most months.9 This pattern indicates
that, although African Americans are more likely to accumulate tickets and other
fines, African Americans with this type of debt have similar case outcomes to nonHispanic consumers. Hispanic consumers, however, have the lowest hazard rates,
both in the full sample and in the subset with tickets and other fines.
Table 4 also points to a phenomenon that is sometimes thought rare: Homeowners using Chapter 13 to pay arrears, not to obtain a discharge. Notice first that the
termination rate is over eleven percentage points higher for homeowners with arrears (column III) than for those without (column II). Otherwise, the consumers are
comparable across most dimensions. The elevated termination rate for homeowners with arrears could reflect their incentive to abandon the Chapter 13 case after
repaying arrears. Figure 2 provides evidence supporting this hypothesis. Here we
plot the probability that a consumer stops payment during the months following repayment of arrears (the x -axis, in other words, measures time relative to the month
in which arrears are paid in full). We see a spike in the probability of stopping
payment in the same month that arrears are paid in full. The probability gradually
declines in subsequent months. We view this as evidence consistent with the hypothesis that one of the pathologies of Chapter 13 – high failure rates – reflects, in
part, decisions by homeowners to abandon their plans after paying arrears.

0.15
0.1
0

0.05

Density

0.2

0.25

Figure 2
Distribution of Months in which Homeowner Stops Payment
Following Full Payment of Mortgage Arrears
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9 In competing-risk survival models, race is a large and highly significant predictor of
failure. When we subset on consumers with at least $500 in debt related to tickets and
other fines, the effect of race falls by over 50 % and is insignificant.

(2017)

Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies

189

6.2 Other Drivers of Early Termination: Trustee and Attorney Behavior
Prior scholarship has pointed to potential biases (agency problems) in attorney and
trustee behavior. Braucher, Cohen, and Lawless (2012), Lefgren, McIntyre, and
Miller (2010), and McIntyre, Sullivan, and Summers (2015) present evidence indicating that attorneys steer clients, especially African Americans, into Chapter 13
cases instead of Chapter 7. Van Loo (2009) observes that trustees file motions to
terminate a case more frequently when the case is filed by an African American.
Our data point to different behavioral patterns that may contribute to Chapter 13
termination rates.
Trustees in our Cook County data appear to require or strongly encourage consumers to submit Chapter 13 plans that pay at least 10 % recoveries to general
unsecured creditors. Part (a) of Figure 3 plots the distribution of promised payoffs
for the first proposed plan, showing spikes at 10 % and 100 %. The first spike is
consistent with the hypothesis that trustees resist plans that pay less than 10 % to
general unsecured creditors. These spikes, however, could reflect the distribution of
income and assets among consumers. A Chapter 13 plan must pay unsecured creditors no less than they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Additionally, the
consumer must promise to pay all of her disposable income.10 Using those statutory
requirements, and assuming that the typical consumer has disposable income equal
to about 11 % of her monthly income (this was the average in our data), we imputed for each consumer the minimum payoff that must be promised to unsecured
creditors in a Chapter 13 plan.11 Part (b) compares this imputed plan payoff with
the actual payoff proposed in each plan, showing that the spike at 10 % is a substantial deviation from what the statute requires. Nothing in our data indicates that
these deviations are attributable to the trustees, but we have been told by judges on
the bankruptcy court that trustees will not recommend confirmation of plans that
do not provide for at least a 10 % payoff to general unsecured creditors. Braucher
(1993) observed a similar pattern, with trustees and judges resisting plans that offered less than a floor recovery to unsecured creditors (between 10 % and 100 % in
her data).
If trustees in Cook County do resist plans that offer less than a 10 % floor recovery, consumers seeking to use Chapter 13 may understate their monthly expenses in
order to show that they have sufficient disposable income to pay the floor recovery.
Because they are pledging income that may be needed for expenses, these consumers are more financially fragile, and will likely have higher failure rates, than
consumers who propose plans that are more consistent with their ability to pay.
We explore this phenomenon in Table 5, which compares termination rates of consumers whose plans exceed the statutory requirement and consumers whose plans
10 This requirement is binding, however, only if a creditor or the trustee objects. This
rule is set out in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). We do not know how often consumers propose
plans that will pay less than disposable income and that do not face objections.
11 The procedure for calculating this payoff is described in the online appendix, available at http://www.coll.mpg.de/sites/www/files/Morrison_OnlineAppendix.pdf.
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Figure 3
Distribution of Promised Payoffs to General Unsecured Creditors:
Actual versus Imputed Plans
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do not. Consumers with 10 % plans have higher termination rates than consumers
with any other promised payoff to unsecured creditors. Among consumers with
10 % plans, those who are paying more than the statutory requirement have a termination rate of about 50 %, substantially higher than the 42 % rate among those
who are not paying more than the statutory requirement. These patterns suggest
that, by objecting to plans that offer less than a 10 % payoff to unsecured creditors,
trustees are exacerbating Chapter 13’s termination rate.
Attorneys, too, may exacerbate the failure rate, and not just by steering consumers into Chapter 13 even though they would have greater success in Chapter 7.

(2017)

191

Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies
Table 5
Termination Rates by Promised Payout to General Unsecured Creditors:
Comparing Plans that Promise More or Less than Statutory Requirement
Plan payoff >
statutory requirement

Plan payoff 
statutory requirement

% of cases

33.76
42.12
36.00
38.46
14.12

11.15
50.86
17.07
20.92
100.00

Plan Promises Payoff Equal to . . .
under 10 %
41.71
10 %
49.87
10 to 99 %
37.16
100 %
32.69
% of cases
85.88

Figure 4 plots the hazard of failure for cases that survive at least three, six, nine, and
twelve months. Among cases that survive n months (where n D 3;6;9, or 12), we
compare the hazard of termination among cases that paid attorneys in full during
month n with the hazard of termination among cases that did not pay the attorney
in month n or any prior month. Thus, we are comparing two groups of cases, both
Figure 4
Hazard of Case Termination
by Month in which Attorney was Paid in Full
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of which survived n months and neither of which paid the attorney in full in any
prior month. The only difference between the groups is that one paid the attorney
in full in month n. For example, panel (a) compares cases in which the attorney was
paid in month 3 (dashed line) to cases that survived at least 3 months but did not
pay the attorney in full by month 3 (solid line). The dashed and solid lines plot the
monthly hazard during the months after month 3. In each panel of Figure 4, we observe a sharp increase in the failure rate during the months immediately following
payment of the attorney. In parts (a), (c), and (d), we see an increase both relative
to subsequent months and relative to cases in which the attorney had not yet been
paid. These patterns suggest, tentatively, that attorneys may devote less attention
and care to cases after being paid, thereby elevating failure rates.12
6.3 Creditor Recoveries
Although prior scholarship has studied creditor recoveries, we are unaware of studies comparing creditors’ Chapter 13 recoveries with their expected recoveries in
Chapter 7. Under the bankruptcy law, creditors should receive a stream of payments with present value no less than what they would be paid in Chapter 7.
Table 6 computes the difference between the payoff (in percent) that general unsecured creditors received in Chapter 13 cases relative to what they would have
received in a Chapter 7 liquidation. That is, we compute the percentage recovery in
Chapter 13 (x %) and subtract from this the percentage recovery expected in Chapter 7 (y %) to obtain the marginal gain to general unsecured creditors (x %  y %).
For example, among cases in which creditors would have received nothing in ChapTable 6
Difference between Percentage Recovery in Chapter 13 and
Percentage Recovery Expected in Chapter 7
% Recovery expected in
Chapter 7
Panel A: Discharged Cases
0
0 to 10
10 to 20
Over 20

Marginal Gain from Chapter 13
Mean gain Median gain Std. dev.

% of subsample

56.70
56.58
46.21
2.34

51.20
61.70
47.87
0.00

40.22
39.19
39.18
37.26

57.83
8.44
4.72
29.01

Panel B: Terminated Cases
0
2.76
0 to 10
0.80
10 to 20
8.58
Over 20
60.65

0.00
2.32
12.93
60.85

10.08
12.89
15.41
34.03

77.58
6.65
29.57
12.82

12 The same patterns are evident in competing-risk regressions that estimate the effect
of attorney payment on case termination, conditional on a battery of consumer demographic and financial characteristics.
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ter 7 (0 %), the median Chapter 13 recovery was 51 % among discharged cases and
0 % in terminated cases. Similarly, among cases in which creditors would have received a 0 to 10 % recovery in Chapter 7, the median Chapter 13 recovery was 62 %
for discharged cases and 2 % for terminated cases.
We observe a similar pattern in both panels: As the expected recovery in Chapter 7 increases, the marginal gain from Chapter 13 declines. For discharged cases,
the marginal gain from Chapter 13 in the median case is zero when the expected
recovery in Chapter 7 is greater than 20 %. This might seem consistent with the
statutory mandate that unsecured creditors receive no less than they would recover
in Chapter 7, but it is not clear that it is. The statute requires that they receive no
less in present value. Put differently, the internal rate of return (IRR) for discharged
cases should be positive for all cases, but it is zero for the median case when the
Chapter 7 recovery exceeds 20 %. We plot the annualized IRR in Figure 5, though
we exclude cases with expected Chapter 7 recoveries equal to zero because the IRR
for these cases is infinite.13 For every expected recovery in Chapter 7 (x -axis), we
plot the IRR for the median Chapter 13 case (y -axis). Although returns to general
unsecured creditors are hardly meager in discharged cases, especially when expected recoveries in Chapter 7 are relatively low, they decline sharply as expected
recoveries in increase. Among cases plotted in Figure 5 – that is, discharged cases
with expected Chapter 7 recoveries greater than zero – over 34 % have an IRR that
is zero or negative.
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Figure 5
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) to General Unsecured Creditors,
Subsetting on Completed Chapter 13 Plans with Expected Chapter 7 Recoveries > 0 %
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Returns in terminated cases do appear meager (and often negative relative to
Chapter 7), as Panel B of Table 6 shows, but these statistics are misleading. After a
case terminates, creditors can seek to liquidate the consumer’s assets and obtain ad13 We are able to compute the IRR because the NDC data provide the size and timing
of payments to creditors.
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ditional recoveries. Thus, Panel B of Table 6 significantly understates the marginal
recovery to unsecured creditors. Indeed, if the value of the consumer’s property
does not change during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case, creditors will generally have a positive marginal return from Chapter 13 cases: They receive cash
flows through the plan and, after it terminates, obtain the liquidation value of the
debtor’s nonexempt assets, which is what they expected from a Chapter 7 case. As
long as the cash flows are sufficiently large to compensate creditors for the delay
in obtaining the liquidation value of the debtor’s assets, creditors always do better
from a Chapter 13 case that fails than from a Chapter 7 filing.

7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence – drawn from cases filed in Cook County, Illinois – that raises questions about patterns and pathologies documented in the consumer bankruptcy literature. Prior studies show that Chapter 13 cases have high
(and difficult to explain) termination rates, exhibit racial disparities in filings and
outcomes, and yield meager recoveries to creditors. Our data suggest that, at least
in Cook County, Illinois, these pathologies are largely driven by a subsample of
consumers for whom Chapter 13 is an avenue for bargaining with state and local
governments. These consumers have accumulated fines, usually parking tickets,
and are at risk of having their licenses or vehicles (or both) seized by the government. In these cases, the government has a “hostage taking” power that few
creditors possess: It can seize property (a driver’s license) that is valueless to the
government or any other party, but is highly valuable to the consumer because it
reduces the cost of commuting to work, especially for people with limited access
to mass transit. These “parking ticket” cases have very high failure rates, in part
due to the fact that a substantial number of these consumers have near-poverty incomes and little or no property that could be seized in liquidation. It appears that
African Americans are particularly vulnerable to this hostage-taking. They account
for well over fifty percent of people with tickets and other fines. Consumers in this
category exhibit the “pathologies” commonly associated with Chapter 13. Those
pathologies are much less pronounced among other consumers.
This finding suggests that some of the aberrational features of Chapter 13 may be
a product of intersecting features of bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law: (1) Chapter 13 permits the discharge of tickets and other civil fines (unlike Chapter 7) and
requires the government to return suspended licenses and seized vehicles to the
consumer as soon as she files for bankruptcy, and (2) government policy regarding
tickets and other fines, which appears to affect African Americans more than other
consumers.
Our data also confirm and extend other patterns observed in prior work, including potential biases in the behavior of trustees and attorneys. Our data suggest that
Chapter 13 termination rates are elevated by trustee preferences for plans that pay
at least 10 % recoveries to unsecured creditors. We also observe a spike in termina-
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tion rates immediately after the consumer pays her attorney in full. Finally, our data
show that creditor recoveries are not necessarily as meager as some have thought.
Among cases with very low expected recoveries in Chapter 7, creditors’ marginal
recoveries are substantial in Chapter 13.
Because our results are drawn from a single geographic area (Cook County, Illinois) within the jurisdiction of a single court (the Northern District of Illinois),
we cannot say whether the same patterns would be evident in other areas of the
United States. In many respects, as section 5 showed, the demographic, financial,
and case characteristics of consumers in our sample are comparable to the characteristics of consumers in samples studied by other scholars, who have focused on
different geographic areas. But there are features of Cook County and the Northern
District of Illinois that may distinguish it from other areas. One is the reliance of
low-income consumers on personal automobiles for transportation. Limitations of
Cook County’s mass transit system may lead to greater reliance there than in other
areas. Similarly, local policy regarding enforcement of traffic and parking tickets
may be more aggressive, or have more disparate effect on African Americans, in
Cook County than elsewhere (although recent media reports, including Lithwick,
2016, suggest otherwise). Another potentially distinctive feature is the jurisprudence of the Northern District of Illinois. In 2009, it joined a number of courts
in recognizing the consumer’s authority, under the bankruptcy law, to force creditors to return property to the consumer, including vehicles and drivers’ licenses.14
One more potentially distinctive feature is the trustees’ preference for plans with
a minimum 10 % payoff to general unsecured creditors. Although this preference
is not unique to Cook County – Braucher (1993) observed similar preferences in
other areas – we do not know whether such a preference is commonly observed
throughout the United States.
Although the generalizability of our results is a question for future work, we believe that this paper raises questions about underlying heterogeneity in consumer
bankruptcy cases and points to potentially fruitful lines of inquiry, including the influence of government policy regarding fines on the use of Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
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